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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 837 (1993)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) of 6 June 1993. In that resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

> "1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);
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> "2. Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;
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> "3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56 to 69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (S/25354), and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;
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> "4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal preparatory meeting on Somali political reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on implementing the cease-fire and on modalities of disarmament (S/25168, annex III);
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> "5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;

"6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;

"7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all ranks, as well as equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354);

"8. Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its mandate;

"9. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its adoption."

2. In paragraph 57 of his report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354), which is referred to in section B, paragraph 5, of Security Council resolution 814 (1993) and paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 837 (1993), the Secretary-General listed the military tasks included in UNOSOM II's mandate.

3. The present report is divided into five sections, of which the first three are based on the interim reports submitted to the members of the Security Council and the UNOSOM II troop-contributing countries on 6, 14 and 18 June 1993. Section I provides a brief account of the events leading up to the ambush of UNOSOM II troops in Mogadishu on 5 June 1993 and to the adoption of Security Council resolution 837 (1993). Section II covers the first phase of the implementation of the UNOSOM II programme, pursuant to resolution 837 (1993), to disarm South Mogadishu and neutralize broadcasting systems there that were inciting violence against UNOSOM II. Section III covers UNOSOM II's coordinated ground and air operation, launched on 17 June, to search and disarm the headquarters area in South Mogadishu of General Aidid (Chairman of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA)). Section IV deals with the effect of the recent events on UNOSOM II humanitarian activities. Section V contains my observations on the events set out in the preceding four sections.

I. ATTACKS ON UNOSOM II TROOPS ON 5 JUNE 1993

4. I wish to mention that, during the course of the events described in the present report, I remained in constant touch with my Special Representative in Somalia.

5. The events of 5 June 1993 in Mogadishu were triggered by a scheduled inventory by UNOSOM II of five militia weapon-storage sites, one of which was co-located with the radio transmission relay facility north of the city, with another at the radio broadcast studio in the city itself. Prior written notice of the inspection had been given to the staff of General Aidid, Chairman of USC/SNA. However, while the inspection was in progress, several apparently

organized demonstrations, roadblocks, ambushes and armed attacks began throughout Mogadishu South, all of them directed against UNOSOM II troops, including Pakistani troops guarding a feeding point for Somali civilians. Ostensibly these events were in protest against an alleged action by UNOSOM II, announced by General Aidid, to "seize" Radio Mogadishu (Aidid). No such seizure had taken place, nor was it intended. While General Aidid and USC/SNA denied it, the attacks that occurred on 5 June 1993 appeared to be a calculated, premeditated series of major cease-fire violations meant to challenge and intimidate UNOSOM II. The sequence of events is described in the following paragraphs.

6. At 4 p.m. on 4 June 1993, UNOSOM II sent letters to the USC/SNA faction in Mogadishu informing the latter of its plan to conduct, on the following day, weapons verification inspections of the authorized weapons storage sites in four locations in South Mogadishu and one site in Afgoy. The last inspections had been conducted by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in January and February 1993.

7. On the morning of 5 June 1993, the inspections began. Those at the Afgoy site and two of the four sites in Mogadishu were conducted without incident. The inspection at Site 5 - "Mogadishu Radio (Aidid)" location - went smoothly until it was near completion. At that time several agitators arrived on scene and began to incite the crowd that had gathered. At Site 4, a major storage site located at the Aidid radio retransmission facility, the inspection team met some verbale resistance but was allowed to enter and conduct the inspection. At this site, the team was subjected to sniper fire throughout the day. It was at Site 3 that a large number of weapons were found, including 62 tow missiles, 2 Milan missiles and 1 SA-7, which were later removed. Thirteen technical vehicles and a number of machine-guns previously in storage were no longer present.

8. At about 10 a.m. in other areas in South Mogadishu, demonstrations began and the UNOSOM II Force Command headquarters was fired on. Pakistani and Turkish soldiers returned fire. Later, Pakistani units returning from incidents elsewhere in Mogadishu transited 21 October Road, where they encountered a large, carefully prepared three-sided ambush that resulted in extensive casualties. The quick reaction force was deployed in the afternoon to relieve the Pakistani forces pinned down in a facility known as the "cigarette factory" on 21 October Road. At feeding station No. 20, a Pakistani unit helping with food distribution was attacked by a carefully coordinated group of gunmen who used a crowd of women and children as a shield to overwhelm United Nations soldiers who refused to fire at the crowd. Several soldiers were murdered, others were wounded and the remainder were captured.

9. During these attacks, militia forces employed automatic weapons, RPGs and hand grenades. Serious disturbances continued throughout the day, including attacks on UNOSOM II civilian headquarters (where two hand grenades were thrown into its compound but did not explode), isolation of and attacks on Pakistani forces at checkpoints, random sniper attacks and armed roadblocks. As a result of the various attacks, in particular the large ambush on 21 October Road and the attack on feeding station No. 20, 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 listed as missing and 57 wounded (54 Pakistani, 3 United States). Casualties on the Somali side are believed to have been high but their numbers are not yet known.

10. Contact with USC/SNA was difficult to establish during the morning because of the intensity of the disturbances around UNOSOM II headquarters. The first contact was made through a UNOSOM II national officer at 1300 hours. This was followed by an afternoon meeting between a UNOSOM II official and two USC/SNA senior officials at USC/SNA headquarters, during which USC/SNA attempted to disassociate itself from the incidents, asserting that the disturbances were spontaneous outbursts by an angry public. In the light of the organized nature of the attacks, and several Aidid radio broadcasts accusing UNOSOM II of wrongly shooting women and children without provocation, the USC/SNA disclaimer is difficult to accept. At an early evening meeting, even as USC/SNA emissaries were assuring UNOSOM II officials of their good intentions and desire for the restoration of peace, Aidid radio and vehicle-mounted loudspeakers were continuing to agitate the public to attack UNOSOM II.

11. From the incidents of 5 June, it was clear that numerous weapons still remained with the public at large in Mogadishu. It was also clear that this would have to be factored into the UNOSOM II follow-up to the incidents, if security was to be maintained. Although investigations were not complete, the attacks constituted a gross violation of the cease-fire agreement and a blatant attack on United Nations troops.

12. Early on 6 June, General Aidid's personal broadcast over Radio Mogadishu fell far short of calming the situation as his emissaries had indicated was his intention. Instead, he articulated more anti-UNOSOM II rhetoric, urged calm if UNOSOM II acquiesced to his demands and violence if it did not. At this juncture, it would appear that the General was seeking a confrontation with UNOSOM II in order to take control of the political reconciliation and of the efforts to reactivate the Somali judicial system.

13. UNOSOM II sent a written message to General Aidid advising him of the United Nations and international community's outrage and urging him to desist from the disastrous course he had set for himself and his followers. It was pointed out to General Aidid that that was the last opportunity for him to become part of the peace process.

14. In order better to protect the civilian staff of UNOSOM II and international agency and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel after the 5 June attacks, the Special Representative decided to consolidate the staff of the operation into several secure and logistically supportable locations. From these sites UNOSOM II would continue to accomplish all essential work. Meanwhile, the Force Command was strengthening its posture and preparing for possible contingencies.

15. I have placed on record my appreciation and admiration for the courageous and disciplined manner in which the Pakistani and other UNOSOM II troops conducted themselves in very difficult circumstances while they were attempting to carry out their duties under the UNOSOM II mandate.

16. I have kept the Council fully informed of further developments relating to the situation in Mogadishu. On 6 June 1993 the Security Council, after considering the Secretary-General's report on the incidents in Mogadishu on 5 June, adopted resolution 837 (1993).

II. ACTION TAKEN BY UNOSOM II: FIRST PHASE (12-14 JUNE 1993)

17. Preparations for the implementation of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) were undertaken by UNOSOM II immediately following the adoption of that resolution. The object of the subsequent UNOSOM II actions was to restore security and law and order in Mogadishu by implementing a comprehensive programme for disarmament in the capital, neutralizing broadcasting systems and other propaganda mechanisms used to incite violence and preventing further violations of the cease-fire. This would make it possible to resume the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population, facilitate economic rehabilitation and reconstruction and promote political reconciliation for all Somalis. At the same time UNOSOM II instituted a thorough investigation of the incidents of 5 June with a view to taking the measures indicated in paragraph 5 of resolution 837 (1993). UNOSOM II meanwhile remained open to dialogue, to ascertain if there was a way to carry out the resolution cooperatively. Regrettably, General Aidid and USC/SNA, by their actions, demonstrated that they did not desire a cooperative solution.

18. On 8 June 1993 a letter was addressed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to General Aidid, Chairman of USC/SNA, reminding him, inter alia, of the prohibition against the display of weapons and the requirement to cooperate fully in the disarmament programme in Mogadishu. However, efforts to deliver the letter to General Aidid personally were not successful until several days later. In a letter of the same date to the Chairmen of the 11 non-SNA Somali political factions, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General cautioned that no group or individual should seek to take advantage of the current tension in Mogadishu, and solicited the cooperation of all factions and movements towards the political and physical reconstruction of Somalia.

19. At 4 a.m. on 12 June, UNOSOM II began the implementation of the first phase of a programme pursuant to Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) to disarm Mogadishu South. This was an essential step in the light of the fact that the city was saturated with a vast arsenal of hidden illegal weapons, some of which had been used during the premeditated attacks of 5 June. In a series of carefully planned precision air and ground military actions, UNOSOM II disabled or destroyed ordnance, weapons and equipment located in three previously authorized weapons storage sites, and a related clandestine military facility used for the ambush on 5 June. These and subsequent strikes were conducted utilizing tactics that would minimize casualties as well as collateral damage to nearby areas. Where possible, ammunition not already destroyed was safely detonated by trained explosive ordnance personnel. The relay transmitter site for Radio Mogadishu was occupied and ammunition removed. Elements of the Pakistani, French, United States, Moroccan and Italian contingents participated in the first day's actions.

20. Another major objective of the coordinated military action called for by the Security Council in paragraph 3 of resolution 837 (1993) was the neutralization of Radio Mogadishu, the former Somali State radio, which had been taken over by USC/SNA and was being used to encourage violence against UNOSOM II. Two main targets associated with the radio system were the broadcast studio in downtown Mogadishu and a radio relay transmitter facility in one of the major authorized weapons storage sites. The broadcast facility was disabled

by precision air attack in the early morning when minimally occupied. This timing avoided the military and civilian casualties that would have resulted from a ground assault to seize the facility. The radio relay transmitter facility, on the other hand, was taken by integrated air and ground action, and held for the first day of operations. The site has since been evacuated and reusable equipment stored in a safe place. This equipment will be returned to the people of Somalia as soon as feasible. UNOSOM II intends to locate and take similar action in relation to Radio "Voice of the Somali Masses", which, since it started broadcasting recently, has issued inflammatory propaganda.

21. On 13 and 14 June UNOSOM II forces conducted additional precision air strikes on two clandestine weapons/ammunition storage sites within the SNA/Aidid Mogadishu stronghold area. One was a heavily guarded weapons, ammunition and vehicle storage area that held approximately 30 heavy weapons carrier "technical" vehicles in various states of repair. The site also served as a vehicle repair facility where "technicals" were assembled. In addition, the site was reported to contain large numbers of small arms and crew-served weapons, as well as an ammunition cache that included significant quantities of large-calibre automatic-weapons ordnance. The other site held technical vehicles, small arms and ammunition, plus heavy engineering equipment used to construct barricades. On the morning of 15 June, aerial reconnaissance observed and destroyed a 122-mm BM21-1 mobile rocket launcher in the stronghold area near the USC/SNA headquarters. This weapon is an indiscriminate 36-tube area weapon with a range of 500 metres to 20 kilometres, capable of striking anywhere in Mogadishu.

22. The actions of 12 to 14 June formed part of a continuing effort as called for by Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993) effectively to initiate the disarmament process and neutralize all heavy weapons. This includes known USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in and around Mogadishu, and any other which immediately threatened the city. UNOSOM II facilities were used to call on citizens of Mogadishu to turn in their arms peacefully and to help in the identification of clandestine arms caches. Getting arms under control is fundamental to the restoration of law and order and public safety.

23. Preliminary reports indicate that civilian crowds, including women and children, were used by General Aidid and his supporters as human shields to screen attacks on UNOSOM II fixed guard posts or strong points. Similar tactics resulted in the deaths of 25 United Nations soldiers as a result of the attacks of 5 June and an undetermined number of Somali civilian deaths at KM-4 on 13 June 1993. Evidence in hand shows that a violent demonstration was staged by SNA elements in which the crowd was encouraged by agitators to attack Pakistani soldiers at a strong point. Shots were fired from the crowd at United Nations soldiers on the ground, and automatic weapons fire was directed at them from an adjacent building. A United Nations rooftop covering position returned fire on those shooting at the UNOSOM II soldiers on the ground. Witnesses have stated that armed Somalis nearby fired into the crowd, confirming that that was a carefully staged incident calculated to create casualties before the world press and try to weaken the United Nations forces' effectiveness in dealing with organized mobs in the future. UNOSOM II's Force Command is developing revised tactics and additional riot control equipment has been introduced as a means of maintaining control of similar crowds. A UNOSOM II investigation of the 13 June

incident at KM-4 has been initiated, and every effort will be made to ascertain the facts and take whatever preventive action may be required to avoid any further civilian casualties.

24. Although the investigation was not complete at this stage, it was already apparent that there was a conspiracy to commit premeditated acts of violence and that agitation by various means was used in an attempt to stir public anger. Those responsible had not yet been identified but it was apparent that elements of USC/SNA conducted the attacks.

III. ACTION TAKEN BY UNOSOM II: SECOND PHASE (17-25 JUNE 1993)

25. At 1.30 a.m. on 17 June, UNOSOM II forces undertook a coordinated ground and air operation whose purpose was to search, clear and disarm the Aidid headquarters area in South Mogadishu known to be a USC/SNA stronghold. Several clandestine arms storage sites in this area had already been neutralized on 13 and 14 June.

26. This operation was carried out in a manner designed to minimize Somali casualties and to allow those in the stronghold to depart. Its objectives were successfully accomplished by mid-afternoon. Mines, hand grenades, weapons and numerous documents were evacuated from the enclave. Pakistani units operated inside the stronghold, while Moroccan, Italian and French forces formed a mechanized cordon around it, sealing the area. Outside and on the periphery of the cordon, the SNA militia initiated a series of attacks and ambushes from military strongpoints, coordinated in many instances with ostensibly unarmed groups of civilians. In at least one case, the "unarmed" civilians unleashed hand grenades at Moroccan troops who were holding their fire. Simultaneously, armed gunmen opened fire from a different direction. In the ensuing engagement, the outnumbered Moroccan troops fought valiantly, but suffered a large number of casualties, including their battalion commander who, although seriously wounded, continued to direct the defence of his besieged unit until his death. I wish on this occasion to pay a special tribute to the Moroccan soldiers for their great courage and devotion.

27. Subsequent coordinated UNOSOM II operations drove the militia from a number of their strong points, including the Digfer Hospital, which yielded a large number of militia prisoners from the hospital facility. The SNA militia used the hospital not only as a base for military operations but also as an ambush and defensive strong point with rifle and machine-gun positions firing against United Nations troops. Operations have continued to the present to attempt to locate additional clandestine weapons storage sites and to locate and disarm remaining elements of the SNA militia in Mogadishu.

28. The skill and courage with which United Nations coalition forces executed the cordon and the search, clear and disarm operation against the USC/SNA enclave and their professional response to the series of subsequent SNA attacks were impressive. By any measure, both the planned operation and the counteraction to SNA militia attacks represented significant successes. The positions of SNA and of General Aidid have been eroded, in terms of attrition of forces, disruption of command/control/communications and loss of clandestine weapons and ammunition. Concurrently, in the Belet Weyne region, Italian forces

secured and destroyed two extensive SNA weapons inventories, which included large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, mortars, machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns, mines and ammunition. Although some of the heavier equipment was unserviceable, much was still usable. In addition, over 30 artillery pieces located about 6 kilometres north of Mogadishu were destroyed by the quick reaction force. Although still a threat to stability, it is expected that the SNA militia in Mogadishu will now be less of an impediment to disarmament, political reconciliation and rehabilitation. Humanitarian assistance has already been stepped up in most sections of Mogadishu and should be back to normal soon.

29. UNOSOM II has continued to face the use of civilian crowds with women and children in front, screening armed attacks on United Nations troops. Such tactics require adequate crowd control measures and equipment. Although more capability is now on hand, additional crowd control equipment (e.g. tear gas/CS) is being acquired on an urgent basis.

30. As reported previously, UNOSOM II will continue its initial disarmament effort until satisfied it has neutralized all known USC/SNA weapons and ammunition storage sites and caches in and around Mogadishu and any others that threaten the city. After this is complete, UNOSOM II will undertake an orderly sector-by-sector disarmament of the city. However, the emphasis will shift to cooperative efforts involving Somalis and UNOSOM II as soon as feasible. UNOSOM II is regularly appealing to the citizens of Mogadishu to turn in their arms peacefully and to help in the location of clandestine arms caches. Disarmament is fundamental to the restoration of law and order and public safety, as well as to unimpeded progress in political reconciliation and national rehabilitation.

31. The United Nations investigation of the recent events has continued to progress, with evidence mounting in support of the premise that there was an SNA conspiracy to commit premeditated acts of violence against UNOSOM II on 5 June; that violations of international humanitarian law have been committed by SNA militia; and that agitation to stir public antagonism is also still being generated.

32. For the reasons set out above, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia publicly called for the arrest and detention of General Mohamed Aidid on 17 June 1993. The arrest and detention of General Aidid would be carried out under UNOSOM II's existing mandate which, inter alia, authorizes such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements that attack United Nations personnel. Moreover, and as reaffirmed in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 837 (1993) "... the Secretary-General is authorized ... to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks ... including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment." General Aidid's militia continues to attack United Nations personnel with sniping, premeditated confrontations violating international humanitarian law, and provocative rhetoric. Moreover, there is increasing evidence that General Aidid deliberately and personally directed the use of women and children for attacks on UNOSOM II soldiers; and that he directed his militia to shoot into the crowd on 13 June in order to create casualties and embarrass the Pakistani forces and UNOSOM II before the assembled

world press. For these reasons, he is considered by UNOSOM II to be a menace to public safety. Therefore, his detention would ensure safety, including that of the Somali people. Others will also be arrested if evidence is developed implicating them in the same or similar crimes or in related illegal activities subsequent to the 5 June attacks.

IV. EFFECT OF THE EVENTS OF 5 TO 18 JUNE ON THE UNOSOM II HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME

33. Despite the very limited resources made available so far for the 1993 relief and rehabilitation programme, United Nations agencies and a large number of NGOs had succeeded, prior to the events of 5 June 1993, in implementing a wide range of humanitarian activities in various sectors. In addition to the provision of essential relief assistance, schools were being reopened, food-for-work was gradually replacing free food distribution, income-generating activities were expanding and commercial enterprise was being re-established.

34. Following the attacks on UNOSOM II forces on 5 June, virtually all of the international relief workers in Mogadishu temporarily relocated to Nairobi. As a result of insecurity in Mogadishu South, many humanitarian programmes, including the distribution of food and medical supplies, came to a temporary standstill in that area. Understandably, the humanitarian agencies were concerned about the immediate and longer-term implications of the disruption in the delivery of urgently needed relief assistance. In addition to residents of Mogadishu, tens of thousands of displaced persons living in both parts of the city continue to rely exclusively on free food rations for their daily meals.

35. As soon as the security situation improved, UNOSOM II and those relief agencies with limited staff still in Mogadishu managed to restart the flow of relief assistance, initially to Mogadishu North. Beginning on 21 June, UNOSOM II forces were able to provide escorts to humanitarian agencies delivering food to distribution sites in Mogadishu South as well. On 22 June, food was delivered to seven sites each in both parts of the city. I would like to pay tribute to the dedicated humanitarian personnel who have maintained their operations under the difficult circumstances prevailing in Mogadishu.

36. The humanitarian programmes in other parts of the country have not been disrupted and staff belonging to United Nations agencies and NGOs continue to discharge their duties in many parts of Somalia. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that a number of areas depend on relief assistance that is dispatched from Mogadishu. It is, therefore, essential that the situation there return to normal as early as possible, so that all relief workers may return to their posts and the implementation of rehabilitation programmes proceed as planned.

37. My Special Representative travelled to Nairobi on 22 June to address the meeting of countries contributing humanitarian assistance to Somalia. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations agencies and NGOs working in Somalia were also represented. Admiral Howe reiterated to the participants his commitment to re-establish the momentum of the relief and rehabilitation programme. His presence at the meeting was also intended to allay fears among some humanitarian agencies that the humanitarian dimension of UNOSOM II's

mission was being marginalized as a result of military actions in the past two weeks.

38. It is essential that the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian assistance continue to be respected and that adequate resources be made available to speed up the implementation of the relief and rehabilitation programmes in all parts of the country. In this context, it is important that the pledges made at the humanitarian meeting in Addis Ababa in March 1993 are converted into actual disbursements and that additional commitments are made. UNOSOM II will, for its part, continue with efforts to facilitate a positive environment for the successful implementation of the humanitarian programmes.

V. OBSERVATIONS

39. The unfolding of events in Mogadishu since 5 June 1993 must be seen against the background of the conditions that the United Nations Operation in Somalia was designed to remedy. It is the chaos, civil war, immense suffering and famine afflicting the Somali people that brought the international community and the United Nations to Somalia. The primary objectives of the mandate entrusted to UNOSOM II are to put an end to the plight of the Somali people, set them firmly on the path to economic rehabilitation and political reconciliation and promote the rebuilding of Somali society and political institutions. This requires the restoration of peaceful conditions throughout Somalia and the effective implementation of the process of disarmament. All the Somali factions committed themselves to such goals under the Addis Ababa agreements, and the Security Council assigned them to UNOSOM II as a priority task.

40. I consider that the UNOSOM II actions set out in the present report have been successful in making it possible to return to the pursuit of the main objectives of the United Nations in Somalia. UNOSOM II military enforcement actions have largely neutralized heavy weapons and the command and control facilities of the factions responsible for the large-scale violations of the cease-fire in Mogadishu. These actions have also made it clear that deliberate attempts to disrupt United Nations and NGO humanitarian relief supplies cannot be tolerated. Already, various elements of Somali society have shown not only an interest in restraint and reconciliation, but also in voluntary disarmament. The tragic price paid by United Nations personnel as well as Somalis in the recent series of events should never be forgotten. However, by demonstrating that it was willing to pay, and exact, the cost of peacemaking, the United Nations may well have saved many more lives and accelerated the disarmament, reconciliation and rehabilitation process.

41. Following the military operations conducted between 12 and 18 June, it is hoped that, barring any unforeseen developments, UNOSOM II will now be able to revert to the peaceful disarmament of all factions and militias throughout the country. It had never been the intention of UNOSOM II to oppose any of the factions, as long as they refrained from violations of the cease-fire, acted with due regard to their own commitments to the Addis Ababa agreements and cooperated in the implementation of the mandate entrusted by the Security Council to this humanitarian operation. In fact UNOSOM II intends to continue to work with all the factions, in an effort to foster conditions for the implementation of the United Nations mandate.

42. The attacks on United Nations peace-keepers were tragic and disturbing incidents, but they will not divert the United Nations from its commitment to Somalia. All they prove is that, in the unique situation prevailing in that country, there are elements that continue to believe, and wrongly so, that their interests are best served by perpetuating chaos, destruction and death. These elements apparently consider that their political prospects would be diminished if conditions in Somalia were normalized and peace restored.

43. I now urge all Somali factions to join UNOSOM II in its mission of peace, disarmament and reconciliation as defined by the Security Council and agreed upon by the faction leaders at Addis Ababa. For my part, I am determined to pursue all necessary efforts to implement Security Council resolutions 814 (1993) and 837 (1993).

44. What the recent incidents in Mogadishu also demonstrated was the courage and devotion of the soldiers of UNOSOM II, who on several occasions sustained death or severe injury while defending themselves and attempting to minimize civilian casualties.

45. I regret and mourn the loss of 29 United Nations soldiers from Pakistan and Morocco, killed in the performance of their peace-keeping duties, and the wounding of 88 soldiers from Morocco, Pakistan and the United States of America. I also deeply regret the casualties suffered by Somali civilians who were caught up in the incidents or were used deliberately to screen military attacks against UNOSOM II troops. In concluding this report, I wish to pay a tribute to my Special Representative, Admiral Jonathan Howe, the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir, and to all the soldiers and civilian staff of UNOSOM II, as well as the staff of the United Nations agencies and of the NGOs, including Somali employees, for the dedication, courage and commitment they have shown in the performance of their complex and dangerous mission. I would also like to express my appreciation to those Member States which have contributed to the success of this Operation.